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Abstract 
The raw data suggest that the global trend towards greater exchange rate flexibility that was 
evident before 1990 has since stopped.  An optimum currency area (OCA) model of 
exchange rate regime choice is estimated.  Four different schemes for classifying exchange 
rate regime are investigated. The explanatory variables in the model have worked against the 
trend towards greater flexibility since 1990, largely because of the reduction in inflation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There have been various empirical studies of the choice of exchange rate regime in recent 
years, but (partly because of a proliferation of alternative regime classification systems) there 
is no universally agreed model, nor do we have a clear picture of recent trends in regime 
choice.  Empirical studies of regime choice tend not to investigate time trends, and frequently 
use time fixed effects to take out the time dimension altogether. This paper has two main 
aims: to estimate a parsimonious baseline model that is robust to alternative regime 
classifications and can be used as the stepping-off point for further hypotheses, and to 
interpret recent trends in regime choice in the light of this model.  In particular we show that 
the trend towards greater flexibility evident before 1990 has stopped, and that this is partly 
attributable to reductions in inflation having made pegging more attractive. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The literature on exchange rate regime choice has not yet settled on a definitive model, but 
the starting point is invariably optimum currency area (OCA) theory, upon which authors 
generally build to consider a variety of alternative hypotheses.  Recent contributions include 
Alesina and Wagner (2006), Berdiev et al. (2012), Bleaney and Francisco (2008), Breedon et 
al. (2012), Carmignani et al. (2008), von Hagen and Zhou (2007), Harms and Hoffmann 
(2011), Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010), Méon and Rizzo (2002) and Rizzo (1998).   Optimum 
currency area theory stresses variables such as country size, as measured by GDP or 
population, openness to international trade (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) and the 
geographical concentration of trade: small, more open economies with greater geographical 
concentration of trade are more likely to peg.  The inflationary experience of the 1970s led to 
the development of a different approach that viewed an exchange rate peg as a commitment 
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device that reflects the willingness of the authorities to incur some costs in exchange for price 
stability.  For example Bleaney and Fielding (2002) present a model in which pegging 
involves choosing the exchange rate before external shocks are observed, but can offer 
greater anti-inflation credibility, so regime choice involves a trade-off between price stability 
and output volatility.  From this point of view the inflation rate can be regarded as an 
indicator of government preferences: governments with a strong desire to insulate output 
from external shocks and/or a high tolerance for inflation prefer floating rates.
2
  The 
increased frequency of currency crises in a world of ever larger capital flows stimulated the 
inclusion of variables intended to capture susceptibility to crises, such as the extent of 
liabilities denominated in foreign currency.  A good survey of the empirical literature is 
provided by von Hagen and Zhou (2007).  Political factors have also been investigated, 
particularly in relation to the discrepancy between self-declared and actual exchange rate 
regimes that was recognized in the 1990s (Alesina and Wagner, 2006; Carmignani et al., 
2008; Méon and Rizzo, 2002). 
 
3. EXCHANGE RATE CLASSIFICATIONS 
Any analysis of regime choice requires a system for classifying exchange rate regimes.  This 
is by no means straightforward, and the appropriate way to do it has been the object of a 
considerable research effort in recent years (see Tavlas et al., 2008, for a review).  In view of 
the lack of agreement about the issue, we consider four alternative schemes for which 
classifications are available for a large sample of countries for all years from 1971 to 2011.   
The four schemes are those of Shambaugh (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Bleaney and 
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 In addition, the algorithms used in some classification schemes may mean that pegs with more than one 
devaluation in a  calendar year, as is  likely to occur with rapid inflation, are in any case often classified as 
floats. 
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Tian (2014), and a modified Shambaugh scheme suggested by Bleaney et al. (2015a).  The 
modification addresses the fact that the Shambaugh scheme has a rather different approach to 
devaluations to the others, which to a considerable degree explains its exceptionally low 
proportion of pegs. 
The classification of exchange rate regimes in each case is binomial: the regime is 
either some sort of peg or band, or a type of float (managed or independent).  A multinomial 
classification is also a possibility, but requires more regime boundaries to be identified, and 
in any case some schemes only provide a binary peg/float classification. 
 The details of the schemes are
3
: 
Shambaugh (2004) [hereafter termed JS].  Each calendar year is analysed separately.  If the 
maximum and minimum of the log of the exchange rate against the identified reference 
currency (the US dollar being the default) do not differ by more than 0.04 over the calendar 
year, that observation is a peg.  Alternatively, if there is a realignment so that the 0.04 
threshold is exceeded, the observation is still a peg if the log of the exchange rate is 
unchanged in eleven months out of twelve.  Thus effectively the level of the exchange rate is 
allowed to vary by ±2%, or alternatively by a realignment of any size in one month and 0% in 
the remaining eleven months, for a peg to be coded.  Note that basket pegs and crawling pegs 
may well not meet these criteria. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) [hereafter termed RR].  Movements of the log of the exchange 
rate against various reference currencies are analysed. Where available, the exchange rate in 
the parallel market rather than the official rate is used. If, over a five-year period from years 
T–4 to T, more than 80% of monthly changes in the log of the exchange rate against any of 
the reference currencies fall within the range ±0.02, the exchange rate regime in all of the 
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 The descriptions are taken from Bleaney et al. (2015a), pp. 3-4  and Table 1. 
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years T–4 to T is classified as some form of peg or band. Alternatively, even if this criterion 
is not met, if the change in the exchange rate is zero for four months or more, it is classified 
as a peg for those months.  Otherwise it is a float.  If the exchange rate moves by more than 
40% in a year, that observation is placed in a separate “freely falling” category (these 
observations are omitted from the analysis in this paper).  Thus the scheme focuses on the 
upper and lower tails of the distribution of monthly exchange rate movements, and 
specifically the proportion that exceed 2% in absolute value.  Note the use of the parallel 
exchange rate; crawling pegs should meet the criteria for a peg if the crawl is slow enough, 
but basket pegs may well not do so. 
Bleaney and Tian (2014) [hereafter termed BT].   Each calendar year is analysed separately.  
The scheme is based on the root mean square residual (RMSE) from a regression similar to 
that of Frankel and Wei (1995) for identifying basket pegs.  For each calendar year, the 
change in the log of the official exchange rate against the Swiss franc (the chosen numéraire 
currency) is regressed on the change in the log of the US dollar and of the euro against the 
Swiss franc.  Occasionally, other reference currencies are added.
4
  If the RMSE from this 
regression is less than 0.01, that country-year observation is coded as a peg.  If the RMSE is 
greater than 0.01, twelve new regressions are estimated, each including a dummy variable for 
a particular month as a test for a realignment.  If the F-statistic for the most significant of 
these dummy variables (April, say) is less than 30, the regime is coded a float.  If the F-
statistic for April is greater than 30, and the RMSE is less than 0.01, the observation is coded 
a peg with a realignment; otherwise it is a float.  The regression approach should cater for 
basket pegs (through the regression coefficients) or crawls (through the intercept), but errors 
may arise from the small number of degrees of freedom in each regression. 
                                                          
4
 See Bleaney and Tian (2014) for details. A similar regression approach to regime classification has been 
suggested by Benassy-Quéré et al. (2006) and Frankel and Wei (2008), but they focus on the estimated 
coefficients rather than the goodness of fit. 
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Bleaney et al. (2015a) [hereafter termed BTY].   The scheme replicates the principle of 
Shambaugh (2004) that for a peg the level of the exchange rate should stay within a ±2% 
range, after allowing for one possible devaluation, but uses the residuals from a Frankel-Wei 
regression, as in the case of BT, to capture basket pegs and crawling pegs.  The regression 
period is extended to 24 months (back to January of the previous year) to deal with the 
problem of lack of degrees of freedom in the BT scheme.  The monthly change in the natural 
logarithm of the exchange rate against the Swiss franc is regressed on the change in  the 
natural logarithm of the US$ and euro rates against the Swiss franc for January of year T-1 to 
December of year T (with the possible addition of other potential anchor currencies as 
regressors, as in BT).  This regression is repeated 24 times, each with the addition of a 
dummy for a single month.  If the maximum F-statistic for the addition of any monthly 
dummy is less than 30, the monthly dummies are omitted and the residuals cumulated.  Year 
T is coded as a peg if the maximum cumulated residual minus the minimum cumulated 
residual < 0.04.  If the maximum F-statistic for addition of any monthly dummy is greater 
than 30, that regression is used in place of the original, and the same criterion of a range of 
the cumulated residuals of less than 0.04 is applied.   Note that, unlike JS, the range permitted 
for a peg is not reduced to zero in the event of a devaluation. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of floats recorded by each classification scheme for 
each year from 1971 to 2011 (countries that are members of the Euro Area are counted as 
pegged from 1999 onwards).   The JS scheme registers by far the highest proportion of floats.  
The other three schemes record a very similar proportion of floats up to the late 1980s, but 
thereafter RR registers a significantly lower proportion than BT or BTY.  All four schemes 
show a shift towards floating up to about 1990, but not since; indeed the JS scheme suggests 
a mild reversal of this trend between 1991 and 2011.  Table 1 shows the estimated coefficient 
of time for each classification for the two periods.  For 1971-90 this coefficient is always 
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positive and highly significant, but the trend is much faster for JS (1.63% p.a.) than for the 
other three (0.63, 0.88 and 0.85% p.a. for RR, BT and BTY respectively).  For 1991-2011 JS 
is again an outlier, showing a highly significant negative trend of -0.68% p.a; for the other 
three the estimated  trend is close to zero and not at all statistically significant. 
In the context of a model of regime choice, any trend in Table 1 may be broken down 
into a combination of (a) trends in the explanatory variables, whose impact on regime choice 
is determined by the coefficients, and (b) a residual trend that we refer to as a trend in 
preferences, since it represents the trend in the choice that is made for given values of the 
explanatory variables.  One of the aims of the paper is to investigate the role of these two 
types of trend in determining the observed trend in choices shown in Table 1. 
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Figure 1.  Percentage of floats identified by year 
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Table 1.  Time trends in regime choice, 1971-90 and 1991-2011 
Classification 
scheme: 
JS RR BT BTY 
     
1971-90     
Sample size 2966 2128 2932 2934 
Time trend 1.63*** 
(10.71) 
0.63*** 
(4.71) 
0.88*** 
(7.60) 
0.85*** 
(7.58) 
1991-2011     
Sample size 3556 2994 3760 3589 
Time trend -0.68*** 
(-4.93) 
-0.021 
(-0.20) 
0.10 
(0.84) 
0.11 
(0.91) 
Notes.  The table shows 100x the coefficient of time (t) in a bivariate regression of Ykjt 
against t, where Ykjt is a binary regime choice variable (peg=0; float=1) according to 
classification scheme k in country j in year t.  JS: Shambaugh (2004); RR: Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004); BT: Bleaney and Tian (2014); BTY: JS24 classification from Bleaney et al. 
(2015a).  Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  *,**,***: significantly different from  zero at 
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
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4. MODELLING THE CHOICE OF REGIME 
Our model of the probability of floating consists of a time trend plus five other variables: 
inflation (expected sign: +), the log of population (+), dummy variables for emerging markets 
and developing countries (+), the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (-) and the Chinn-Ito 
(2006) measure of capital account openness (+).
5
  The theoretical argument for this last 
variable is that, with a more open capital account, potential speculative attacks on a currency 
peg are larger, which may lead the country to prefer some form of float. Other variables, such 
as GDP growth rates, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to broad money and foreign 
direct investment as a percentage of GDP, were considered but were all found to be 
insignificant.  Inflation and the two openness variables are both lagged one year to reduce 
potential endogeneity.  Data sources are given in the Appendix. 
Compared to previous research, this model has three main differences: (1) the 
treatment of country size and level of development; (2) the inclusion of capital account 
openness; and (3) the specification of the inflation variable. 
Country size is usually captured by the log of GDP, which is the sum of the log of 
population and the log of per capita GDP.  We use the log of population, which seems a purer 
measure of country size than the log of GDP, which is also influenced by the level of 
development, and we get a better fit using dummies for different levels of development 
(developed countries, emerging markets, developing countries) than the log of per capita 
GDP, though the results are quite similar. 
We add the Chinn-Ito (2006) measure of capital account openness, which captures 
potential speculative pressure on an exchange rate peg, so that we expect a more open capital 
account to be associated with a greater probability of floating.  This measure is based on four 
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 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this variable. 
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pieces of information: the presence or absence of (a) multiple exchange rates; (b) restrictions 
on current account transactions; (c) restrictions on capital account transactions; and (d) 
requirements for the surrender of export proceeds.   Because this measure has been developed 
relatively recently, it has been little used in previous studies (Harms and Hoffmann, 2011, is 
an exception). 
Inflation is a problem because of its highly skewed distribution, with comparatively few 
extremely high observations.  If the inflation rate is entered linearly, these few observations 
will determine the coefficient no matter what happens at more normal rates of inflation.  One 
approach is to take the logarithm of the inflation rate (Alesina and Wagner, 2006), or to 
transform it as p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of the consumer price index (Bleaney 
and Francisco, 2008; von Hagen and Zhou, 2007), or to include the square of the inflation 
rate to the regression.  These procedures all reduce the problem but fail to eliminate it.  A 
more radical approach that improves the fit, and is used in the working paper version of this 
article (Bleaney et al., 2015b), is to replace the actual inflation rate by a few dummy 
variables for different ranges, so beyond a certain threshold differences in inflation rates are 
entirely ignored.
6
  Here we achieve the same objective of insulating the coefficient at lower 
levels of inflation from the influence of outliers by splitting the inflation variable into two: 
INF1 is equal to the percentage consumer price inflation rate up to 25%, but is set to 25% if 
the inflation rate is above 25%, while INF2 is equal to zero if inflation is less than 25%, and 
to the actual inflation rate minus 25% for rates above 25%.  If the estimated coefficients of 
these two variables are respectively b1 and b2, then the estimated effect of inflation (INF) is 
b1*INF if inflation is below 25%, and 25b1+b2*(INF-25) if inflation exceeds 25%.  If b1 = 
b2, the latter expression also equals b1*INF, but it will emerge that the estimates of b1 and 
b2 are quite different. 
                                                          
6
 The ranges used were 0 to 10 %, 10 to 20 %, 20 to 50  % and greater than 50 %. 
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The equation that we estimate, therefore, is a binomial probit for regime Y (1=float; 
0=peg) in country j in year t according to classification  scheme k:
7
 
𝑌𝑘𝑗𝑡 =
Φ(a0 + a1INF1𝑗𝑡−1 + a2INF2𝑗𝑡−1 + a3LPOP𝑗𝑡 + a4OPEN𝑗𝑡−1 + a5𝐾𝐴OPEN𝑗𝑡−1 +
a6EMDUM𝑗𝑡 + a7DEVDUM𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎8t + u𝑘𝑗𝑡)      (1) 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution; INF1 is the 
consumer price inflation rate truncated to have a maximum of 25%; INF2 is inflation minus 
25% truncated to have a minimum of zero;  LPOP is the log of population; EMDUM  is a 
dummy variable equal to one for emerging markets and zero otherwise; DEVDUM is a 
dummy variable equal to one for developing countries and zero otherwise; OPEN is exports 
plus imports as a percentage of GDP;  is the Chinn-Ito (2006) index of capital account 
openness; t is time (=0 in 2000); the as are parameters to be estimated; and u is a random 
error. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We first estimate equation (1) separately for 1971-90 and 1991-2011, as shown in Tables 2 
and 3. The results are pretty consistent, both across classification schemes and across the two 
time periods. The coefficients shown are estimated marginal effects, and for the dummy 
variables they show the difference between a value of one and zero.  Inflation up to 25% is 
always significant at the 1 % level, and the marginal effect of 0.01 implies that an extra 1 % 
of inflation is associated with an approximately 1 % greater probability of floating.  Inflation 
above 25% has a much smaller coefficient that is generally insignificant.  The difference 
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 Results are similar if we estimate a logit instead of a probit. 
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between the coefficients of INF1 and INF2 is always statistically significant, so the data 
reject a linear specification for inflation. 
 Country size, as measured by population, always has a positive coefficient, but its 
marginal effect tends to be greater after 1990 (Table 3) than before (Table 2).  In Table 3 it is 
always significant at the 1 % level, whereas in Table 2 it is only significant at the 5 % level, 
and in one case (JS) not at all. 
 Openness to international trade, as captured by the ratio of trade to GDP, always has a 
significant negative coefficient whose marginal effect lies in the range -0.1 to -0.2, which 
implies that  an extra ten percentage points in the trade ratio is associated with a lower 
probability of floating of between one and two per cent. 
 Openness of the capital account, as measured by the Chinn-Ito index, has highly 
significant positive coefficients after 1990 (Table 3), but much smaller and less significant 
coefficients in the earlier period.  Indeed for the JS classification in Table 2 the estimated 
coefficient is negative.  This difference may reflect greater concern in more recent years 
about the vulnerability of exchange rate pegs to speculative capital flows in response to major 
currency crises. 
 The dummy variables for emerging markets and developed countries have positive 
coefficients that are significant at  the 1 % level in the majority of cases, which indicates that 
these countries are more likely to float, for given values of the other explanatory variables, 
than are developing countries.  There is quite a lot of variation across classification schemes, 
with the estimated effect tending to be largest for JS and smallest for RR. 
 The estimated time trend for 1971-90 is always significantly positive, and is twice as 
fast for JS (2.0 % p.a.) as for the other three (about 1.0 % pa.).  These figures are quite similar 
13 
 
to the first row of Table 1, which means that the net effect of any trends in the explanatory 
variables was close to zero.  For 1991-2011, the picture is different.  In Table 3 three 
classification schemes show a significant positive time trend of between 0.2 % and 0.6% p.a., 
but in the JS scheme, the estimated time trend is -0.2 % p.a., although it is not significantly 
different from zero. 
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Table 2.  A model of regime choice 1971-1990 
 
Classification: JS RR BT BTY 
From 1971 to 1990 
Observations 1615 1310 1577 1596 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.1862 0.1617 0.1096 0.1459 
Predicted Prob. 0.5936 0.0905 0.1656 0.1594 
time 
0.0208*** 
(8.01) 
0.0078*** 
(5.36) 
0.0106*** 
(5.67) 
0.0095*** 
(5.31) 
INF1 (lagged) 
0.0105*** 
(5.06) 
0.0052*** 
(5.02) 
0.0088*** 
(6.87) 
0.0088*** 
(7.01) 
INF2 (lagged) 
0.00327** 
(2.23) 
-0.00074 
(-1.57) 
-0.00002 
(-1.18) 
-0.00003 
(-1.05) 
ln (population) 
0.0048 
(0.45) 
0.0166** 
(2.29) 
0.0199** 
(2.39) 
0.0182** 
(2.14) 
OPEN (lagged) 
-0.192*** 
(-4.82) 
-0.207*** 
(-6.67) 
-0.066** 
(-2.10) 
-0.115*** 
(-3.11) 
KAOPEN (lagged) 
-0.1193** 
(-2.41) 
0.0390 
(1.48) 
0.0623* 
(1.75) 
0.1068*** 
(3.11) 
Emerging markets 
dummy 
0.234*** 
(6.58) 
-0.074*** 
(-5.09) 
0.038 
(1.05) 
0.097** 
(2.53) 
Developed 
countries dummy 
0.407*** 
(15.9) 
0.015 
(0.36) 
0.186*** 
(6.69) 
0.216*** 
(7.59) 
Notes. The estimation method is probit, with a binary dependent variable (peg=0; float=1) 
according to the following classification schemes: JS: Shambaugh (2004); RR: Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004); BT: Bleaney and Tian (2014); BTY: JS24 classification from Bleaney et al. 
(2015a).  Marginal effects at the means of the independent variables are shown.  Figures in 
parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  *,**,***: significantly different from  
zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. INF1: consumer price inflation (maximum 
25%); INF2: consumer price inflation minus 25% (minimum zero); OPEN: (exports + 
imports)/GDP; KAOPEN: Chinn-Ito capital account openness. 
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Table 3.  A model of regime choice 1991-2011 
 
Classification: JS RR BT BTY 
From 1991 to 2011 
Observations 2984 2572 3099 3121 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.1487 0.2008 0.1184 0.1254 
Predicted Prob. 0.5665 0.0667 0.2854 0.2772 
time 
-0.0017 
(-1.01) 
0.0023** 
(2.52) 
0.0061*** 
(4.13) 
0.0047*** 
(3.28) 
INF1 (lagged) 
0.0249*** 
(13.1) 
0.0055*** 
(7.23) 
0.0137*** 
(9.79) 
0.0145*** 
(10.5) 
INF2 (lagged) 
0.00011 
(0.96) 
-0.00121** 
(-2.07) 
0.00006 
(1.12) 
0.00002 
(0.93) 
ln (population) 
0.0234*** 
(3.70) 
0.0165*** 
(4.54) 
0.0280*** 
(4.89) 
0.0284*** 
(4.98) 
OPEN (lagged) 
 -0.150*** 
(-5.98) 
-0.138*** 
(-8.48) 
-0.128*** 
(-5.69) 
 -0.129*** 
(-5.80) 
KAOPEN (lagged) 
0.169*** 
(5.30) 
0.064*** 
(3.91) 
0.183*** 
(6.46) 
0.174*** 
(6.19) 
Emerging markets 
dummy 
 0.275*** 
(9.38) 
0.060*** 
(2.60) 
0.230*** 
(6.71) 
 0.237*** 
(6.84) 
Developed 
countries dummy 
0.103*** 
(3.75) 
0.128*** 
(5.84) 
0.141*** 
(4.98) 
0.146*** 
(5.13) 
Notes. See Notes to Table 2.  The estimation method is probit, with a binary dependent 
variable (peg=0; float=1).  Marginal effects are shown. 
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Table 4 addresses the issue of the apparent structural break around the end of 1990.  
Equation (1) is estimated over the entire period 1976 to 2011, with the first few years of the 
post-Bretton Woods era omitted because the shift towards floating was probably particularly 
fast then.  Initially every coefficient was allowed to take a different value up to 1990, but the 
differences only tended to be statistically significant for three: time and the two dummy 
variables for emerging markets and developed economies.  The structural break test in Table 
6 shows that the null hypothesis of no structural break in any coefficient is strongly rejected. 
In Table 4 inflation up to 25 %, population, trade openness and capital  account 
openness are all significant at 1 % in every model, with the theoretically expected signs.  
Emerging markets and developed countries are significantly more likely to float, controlling 
for other factors, but for emerging markets this is much less true in the 1971-90 period. 
We turn now to time trends. The post-1990 trend is shown by the coefficient of TIME 
in Table 4.  This coefficient is significantly positive for three classifications (RR, BT and 
BTY), but fairly slow (up to 0.5 percentage points p.a.).  For all four classifications (but 
particularly for JS and BT), this is a significant deceleration of the trend towards floating that 
was evident before 1990 (the estimated shift in the time trend is the coefficient of TIME 
multiplied by the 1971-90 dummy).  This coefficient is always significant at 5 %, but the 
estimates of the shift vary from 0.46 % p.a. (RR), to 0.88 % p,a. (BTY), 1.46 % p.a. (BT) and 
2.57 % p.a. (JS). 
Thus the main message of Table 4 is that the shift in preferences towards floating 
decelerated after 1990, but did not stop entirely. 
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Table 4.  Testing for a structural break in the time trend 1976 – 2011 
 
 JS RR BT BTY 
Observations 4326 3647 4441 4448 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.1541 0.1978 0.1300 0.1384 
Predicted Prob. 0.5735 0.1252 0.2462 0.2421 
Structural break 81.3*** 61.0*** 40.2*** 30.4*** 
1971-90 dummy 
0.0164 
(0.43) 
0.1750*** 
(5.40) 
0.0458 
(1.32) 
-0.0379 
-1.16) 
time 
(=0 in 1990) 
-0.0016 
(-0.96) 
0.0028** 
(2.98) 
0.0057*** 
(4.30) 
0.0044*** 
(3.33) 
time * 1971-90 
dummy 
0.0257*** 
(6.51) 
0.0046** 
(2.46) 
0.0146*** 
(4.35) 
0.0081** 
(2.48) 
INF1 (lagged) 
0.0219*** 
(15.7) 
0.0059*** 
(9.00) 
0.0133*** 
(12.7) 
0.0134*** 
(13.0) 
INF2 (lagged) 
0.00023 
(1.00) 
-0.00103*** 
(-2.66) 
0.000015 
(1.21) 
0.000007 
(0.567 
ln (population) 
0.0198*** 
(3.67) 
0.0174*** 
(5.08) 
0.0258*** 
(5.37) 
0.0264*** 
(5.56) 
OPEN (lagged) 
-0.161*** 
(-7.47) 
-0.162*** 
(-10.6) 
-0.112*** 
(-5.98) 
-0.0126*** 
(-6.58) 
KAOPEN (lagged) 
0.114*** 
(4.15) 
0.058*** 
(4.05) 
0.162*** 
(7.04) 
0.166*** 
(7.24) 
Emerging markets 
dummy (EM) 
0.279*** 
(10.0) 
0.063*** 
(2.67) 
0.222*** 
(6.78) 
0.226*** 
(6.86) 
Developed cos 
dummy (DEV) 
0.120*** 
(4.74) 
0.142*** 
(6.83) 
0.138*** 
(5.45) 
0.135*** 
(5.38) 
EM* 1971-90 
dummy 
-0.088 
(-1.47) 
-0.073*** 
(-11.1) 
-0.143*** 
(-5.08) 
-0.095*** 
(-2.84) 
DEV * 1971-90 
dummy 
0.237*** 
(7.23) 
-0.068*** 
(-9.07) 
0.051 
(1.31) 
0.097** 
(2.42) 
Notes.  See notes to Table  2.  The estimation method is probit, with a binary dependent 
variable (peg=0; float=1).  Marginal effects are shown.  The structural break test is a test of 
the joint hypothesis that all four variables that include the 1971-90 dummy have zero 
coefficients, and is distributed as chi-squared with four degrees of freedom. 
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 Table 1 showed that there was no longer a shift towards floating in observed regime 
choice after 1990, whereas Table 3 indicates that there was still a significant shift in 
preferences towards floating (i.e. for given values of the explanatory variables).  This 
difference suggests that the evolution of the explanatory variables since 1990 has operated in 
favour of pegging, cancelling out the underlying gradual shift in preferences towards floating.  
In Table 5 we investigate this a bit further. 
 The main part of Table 5 is a probit for the period 1991-2011, like Table 3, but 
without INF2, which tended to be insignificant.  Thus Table 5 assumes that inflation above 
25 % has the same effect on regime choice as an inflation rate of exactly 25 %, since INF1 is 
truncated at 25 %.  The last three rows of Table 5 refer to a modification in which INF1 is 
replaced by a detrended  version of itself (RESINF1); this only changes the coefficient of the 
time trend (effectively the time trend now includes the effect of the trend in inflation that has 
been removed).  The estimated time trend with RESINF1 is always less positive (or more 
negative in the case of JS) than with INF1, because of the downward trend in inflation over 
the period. The last two rows of Table 5 show that the difference is significant at the 1 % 
level for three out of the four classifications.  Indeed when INF1 is replaced by RESINF1, the 
time trend is very similar to the raw trend in regime choice shown in Table 1, which implies 
that the downward trend in inflation is responsible for the difference between the trend in 
preferences and the trend in observed regime choice.  
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Table 5.  A model of regime choice 1991-2011 with inflation truncated at 25 % p.a. 
 
Classification: JS RR BT BTY 
From 1991 to 2011 
Observations 2984 2572 3099 3121 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.1485 0.1983 0.1176 0.1252 
Predicted Prob. 0.5648 0.0689 0.2849 0.2772 
time 
-0.00180 
(-1.04) 
0.00236** 
(2.58) 
0.00596*** 
(4.07) 
0.00469*** 
(3.25) 
INF1 (lagged) 
0.0252*** 
(13.5) 
0.0051*** 
(6.81) 
0.0140*** 
(10.1) 
0.0146*** 
(10.6) 
ln (population) 
0.0236*** 
(3.72) 
0.0171*** 
(4.63) 
0.0282*** 
(4.92) 
0.0285*** 
(4.99) 
OPEN (lagged) 
 -0.150*** 
(-5.97) 
-0.139*** 
(-8.38) 
-0.128*** 
(-5.67) 
 -0.129*** 
(-5.80) 
KAOPEN (lagged) 
0.169*** 
(5.28) 
0.067*** 
(4.00) 
0.181*** 
(6.43) 
0.174*** 
(6.17) 
Emerging markets 
dummy 
 0.275*** 
(9.37) 
0.060*** 
(2.57) 
0.230*** 
(6.72) 
 0.237*** 
(6.85) 
Developed 
countries dummy 
0.104*** 
(3.76) 
0.126*** 
(5.74) 
0.142*** 
(5.01) 
0.146*** 
(5.14) 
Estimated time 
trend with 
RESINF1 
-0.00885*** 
(-5.16) 
0.00094 
(1.05) 
0.00205 
(1.47) 
0.00060 
(0.44) 
Difference in time 
trend 
-0.00705*** -0.00142 -0.00391*** -0.00408*** 
t-statistic  -4.08 -0.97 -2.66 -2.83 
Notes. See Notes to Table 2.  The estimation method is probit, with a binary dependent 
variable (peg=0; float=1).  Marginal effects are shown.  The variable RESINF1 is the 
residuals from a regression of lagged INF1 on a time trend from 1991 to 2011.  The last three 
rows of the table show the estimated  time trend when RESINF1 is substituted for lagged 
INF1 in the regression, the difference between the two estimated time trends, and the t-
statistic of this difference. 
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6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
As stressed by Bleaney and Francisco (2008) and von Hagen and Zhou (2007), exchange rate 
regimes are persistent. Equation (1) does not include the lagged regime as a regressor, and so 
the statistical significance of the explanatory variables in equation (1) is exaggerated by this 
element of pseudo-replication.  In Table 6 we test the robustness of the results for 1991-2011 
by adding a lagged dependent variable. 
The lagged dependent variable is highly significant, with coefficients of 0.849 (JS) 
and 0.897 (RR), and rather lower ones of 0.521 for BT and 0.556 for BTY, so the lagged 
regime is a good predictor of the current regime.  The coefficients tend to be smaller and less 
significant than in Table 3, particularly for JS and RR (because the lagged regime explains 
almost everything), although all the explanatory variables remain significant at the 5 % level 
with the expected signs for BT and BTY.  The coefficients of the time trends are of the same 
sign as in Table 3, but are no longer statistically significant.  Nevertheless Table 6 broadly 
confirms the significance of the explanatory variables used in the model.  Inflation is always 
significant at the 1 % level up to 25 %, but not significant beyond that, and population, trade 
openness and capital account openness are all significant at 1 % in the BT and BTY 
classifications.  In the JS classification, they are all significant at 10 %, but with coefficients 
only slightly smaller than for BT and BTY. 
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Table 6.  Allowing for regime persistence 1991-2011 
 
Classification: JS RR BT BTY 
From 1991 to 2011 
Observations 2984 2507 3097 3119 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.6549 0.8397 0.3052 0.3405 
Predicted Prob. 0.5701 0.0160 0.2626 0.2489 
time 
-0.0041 
(-1.62) 
0.0012* 
(1.91) 
0.0024 
(1.57) 
0.0004 
(0.25) 
INF1 (lagged) 
0.0065*** 
(2.80) 
0.0013*** 
(3.43) 
0.0067*** 
(4.39) 
0.0072*** 
(4.75) 
INF2 (lagged) 
0.00001 
(0.43) 
-0.00066 
(-1.57) 
0.00003 
(0.73) 
0.00002 
(1.64) 
ln (population) 
0.0178* 
(1.90) 
-0.0007 
(-0.31) 
0.0194*** 
(3.12) 
0.0185*** 
(3.04) 
OPEN (lagged) 
 -0.062** 
(-2.09) 
-0.012 
(-1.17) 
-0.079*** 
(-3.41) 
 -0.080*** 
(-3.44) 
KAOPEN (lagged) 
0.078* 
(1.75) 
-0.0026 
(-0.29) 
0.114*** 
(3.88) 
0.099*** 
(3.35) 
Emerging markets 
dummy 
 0.121** 
(2.16) 
0.037 
(1.39) 
0.140*** 
(3.84) 
 0.131*** 
(3.57) 
Developed 
countries dummy 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.051*** 
(2.76) 
0.076*** 
(2.75) 
0.076*** 
(2.75) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.849*** 
(79.6) 
0.897** 
(37.4) 
0.521*** 
(28.2) 
0.556*** 
(30.3) 
Notes. See Notes to Table 2. The estimation method is probit, with a binary dependent 
variable (peg=0; float=1).  Marginal effects are shown. 
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We have chosen a date of the end of 1990 in testing for a structural break in Table 4. In Table 
7 we examine the effect of dating it two years earlier, at the end of 1988, or two years later, at 
the end of 1992.  Table 6does not show the full results, but just the estimated time trend in the 
later period and the time trend multiplied by an early-period dummy.  The results are fairly 
similar to those in Table 4.  The estimated time trend in the later period is negative for the JS 
classification, but significantly positive in five out of six cases for the other three 
classifications.  The time trend in the early period is significantly more positive in seven out 
of the eight cases.  
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Table 7.  Alternative dates for a structural break 
 
Classification 
scheme: 
JS RR BT BTY 
     
Break date: 
end-1988 
    
Time trend 
in second 
period 
-0.00104 
(-0.70) 
0.00174** 
(2.01) 
0.00546*** 
(4.55) 
0.00528*** 
(4.48) 
Early period 
dummy * time 
trend 
0.0323*** 
(6.70) 
0.00766*** 
(3.34) 
0.0147*** 
(3.59) 
0.0100** 
(2.48) 
Break date: 
end-1992 
    
Time trend 
in second 
period 
-0.00327* 
(-1.71) 
0.00301*** 
(2.86) 
0.00427*** 
(2.86) 
0.00177 
(1.20) 
Early period 
dummy * time 
trend 
0.0212*** 
(6.06) 
0.00059 
(0.35) 
0.0110*** 
(3.85) 
0.00705** 
(2.49) 
Note.  See notes to Table 4, where the structural break is assumed to occur at the end of 1990. 
The table shows selected coefficients if the break is assumed t occur (a) at the end of 1988; or 
(b) at the end of 1992. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper a parsimonious binary model of the choice of exchange rate regimes is 
estimated, and time trends in regime choice investigated, over the period 1971 to 2011.  The 
probability of floating increases significantly with inflation (but only up to a certain level), 
population and capital account openness, and decreases significantly with trade openness.  
Controlling for these factors, the popularity of floating was increasing fairly rapidly up until 
about 1990, since when the trend has been considerably weaker, although still statistically 
significant according to three classifications.  This deceleration, combined with a general fall 
in  inflation rates that has increased the popularity of pegs, has meant that in terms of raw 
numbers the pre-1990 trend in the proportion of countries that are classified as floating has 
stopped. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table A1.  Data sources 
Variable Data source 
JS classification Jay Shambaugh’s website: www.gwu.edu/~iiep/jshambaugh 
RR classification Carmen Reinhart’s website: www.carmenreinhart.com 
BT classification 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/news-
events/news/papers/1501.aspx 
BTY classification 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/news-
events/news/papers/1503.aspx 
Consumer Price Index 
World Development Indicators from World Bank website:  
http://data.worldbank.org/  
Total population 
Trade openness 
Capital openness 
The Chinn-Ito Index:  
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm  
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Appendix Table A2.  Sample of Countries (182)
 
Developed Countries 
(36)
1 
Euro Area (18) 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, 
Spain; 
Major Advanced Economies (7, 3 of them in Euro Area) 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States;  
Other Advanced Economies (14) 
Australia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Israel, Korea, 
Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland. 
Emerging Market 
Countries (18)
2 
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey. 
Other Developing 
Countries (128) 
Commonwealth of Independent States (11) 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; 
Asia (19) 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Laos, Maldives, 
Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam; 
Europe (8) 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia; 
Latin America and the Caribbean (28) 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, 
Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela; 
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (19) 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, Yemen; 
Sub-Saharan Africa (43) 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Rep. of 
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia. 
1
 According to the IMF World Economic Outlook (2015); 
2
 According to the MSCI Emerging Markets Indexes (excluded Korea and Czech that are classified as developed 
countries); 
 
 
 
